

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 KINSHA 00397 161621Z

40

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 000410

O 161357Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6046

S E C R E T KINSHASA 0397

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2

TAGS/ PFOR, CG, AO, UN

SUBJECT: ANGOLA: GOZ CONTEMPLATES UN ACTION

REF: KINSHASA 0388 DTD JAN 16, 1976

1. SUMMARY. FOLLOWING UP CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL, I MET WITH BISENGIMANA MORNING JAN. 16. BISENGIMANA CONFIRMED MAIN POINTS OF BULA'S PITCH, BUT ALSO PUT ZAIRE'S REQUEST FOR US MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ITS APPROACH TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN FRAMEWORK OF A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE AIMED AT SOLIDIFYING THE ANTI-SOVIET/CUBAN BLOCK IN AFRICA. AS PART OF THIS SCENARIO, HE EVEN FORESAW A CAREFULLY PLANNED, BUT PUBLIC SERIES OF BLACK AFRICAN OVERTURES TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

2. BISENGIMANA WENT BACK OVER THE POINTS BULA MADE YESTERDAY EVENING -- BUT IN MORE DETAILS WHILE ZAIRIAN EFFORTS AIMED AT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE ANGOLA WAR WERE UNDERWAY AT THE OAU, THE SOVIETS/CUBANS PRESSED THEIR OFFENSIVE NOT ONLY IN ANGOLA, BUT ATTACKED ZAIRIAN TERRITORY AT DILOLO AS WELL. HEAVY SHELLING FROM THE MPLA/CUBAN STRONGHOLD AT TEXEIRA DE SOUSA CAUSED SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO DILOLO, WHERE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION HAD TO BE EVACUATED. ZAIRE REACTED IN SELF DEFENSE EARLY THIS WEEK BY SENDING ITS AIRCRAFT TO BOMB TEXEIRA DE SOUSA.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 KINSHA 00397 161621Z

3. BISENGIMANA SEES THE SOVIET/CUBAN ATTACK ON

DILOLO AS PROOF OF AN AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY AGAINST ZAIRE AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES. AND IT IS THE GOZ'S INTENT TO USE THE DILOLO ATTACK AS A TOUCHPOINT OF A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE TO SOLIDIFY THE ANTI-SOVIET/CUBAN BLOCK IN AFRICA, AS WELL AS TO BRING FORCEFULLY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE WEST THE NEED FOR INCREASED MILITARY/POLITICAL SUPPORT. AMPLIFYING BULA'S REMARKS RE A GOZ APPROACH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BISENGIMANA MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHAT ZAIRE HAD IN MIND WAS A LETTER ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, INFORMING THE UN OF THE GRAVE THREAT TO ZAIRE'S SECURITY. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT A CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL WOULD BE USEFUL, SINCE THE SOVIETS COULD EITHER VETO OR INSIST THAT THE "POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA" BE INVITED TO MAKE ITS CASE -- THE RESULT OF WHICH WOULD BE ENDLESS CHARGES AND COUNTER CHARGES.

4. BISENGIMANA ALSO SAID IT WAS ZAIRE'S PLAN TO APPROACH THE "MOST IMPORTANT AND REPRESENTATIVE AFRICAN STATES WHO HAD SHOWN RESISTANCE TO THE SOVIETS/CUBANS AT THE OAU SUMMIT AND TO ASK THEM TO JOIN WITH ZAIRE IN OPENLY REQUESTING US AND OTHER WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE WAS NOT TOO CLEAR ON A SECOND POINT, BUT I BELIEVE HE ALSO HAS IN MIND ENCOURAGING FRIENDLY AFRICAN STATES TO JOIN WITH ZAIRE IN SENDING A DELEGATION TO THE U.S. TO MAKE THEIR CASE BEFORE CONGRESS AND US PUBLIC OPINION.

5. IN ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING STRATEGY OF OPENLY ASKING FOR US AND WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT, BISENGIMANA FORESAW THE NEED AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF A PUBLIC RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN KEY BLACK AFRICAN STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA. HE GUESSED THAT THOSE BLACK AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHO HAD ALREADY CALLED FOR DIALOGUE WITH SOUTH AFRICA COULD REISSUE THEIR CALL. THEN ZAIRE AND OTHERS, HITHERTO HESITANT, WOULD AGREE. AND THROUGH A SERIES OF CAREFULLY PLANNED BUT FAIRLY QUICK MOVES -- AN OPEN ALLIANCE WITH SOUTH AFRICA COULD TAKE PLACE. BISENGIMANA, IN OTHER WORDS, SEES THE NEED TO KEEP THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN ANGOLA AS THE MOST IMMEDIATE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 KINSHA 00397 161621Z

AND EFFECTIVE COUNTERPOINT TO SOVIET/CUBAN PRESSURE, BUT RECOGNIZES THAT SOUTH AFRICA WANTS OPEN SUPPORT FROM THE BLACK AFRICAN STATES IN EXCHANGE FOR SUCH A GAMBLE.

6. I THANKED BISENGIMANA FOR HIS FULL EXPOSE OF ZAIRIAN STRATEGY AND SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT IMMEDIATELY. I POINTED OUT THAT I WAS STILL AWAITING WASHINGTON'S

REACTION FROM MY TALK WITH BULA (REFTTEL) AND WOULD SOON WISH TO MEET WITH MOBUTU TO RELAY THE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS. I ASKED HIM WHAT PROOF HE HAD OF SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE DILOLO ATTACKS, AND HE SAID A COMBINATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND MORTAR/ROCKET FRAGMENTS. I ASKED HIM IF KAUNDA WAS ON BOARD WITH HIS SCENARIO, AND HE SAID HE WAS SURE HE WOULD BE, BUT ADMITTED THAT NO ONE HAD CONTACTED THE ZAMBIAN LEADER SINCE THE SUMMIT. GOZ EMISSARIES WOULD SOON BE SENT TO LUSAKA AND OTHER CAPITALS, HOWEVER.

7. I ALSO REMINDED BISENGIMANA OF THE EXPLOSIVENESS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ISSUE, NOT ONLY IN AFRICA BUT IN THE U.S. AS WELL. HE COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT "YOU AMERICANS HAVE BEEN ANTI-SOUTH AFRICAN ONLY BECAUSE YOU BELIEVE THAT TO BE OTHERWISE WILL INCUR THE WRATH OF BLACK AFRICA. IF WE OURSELVES WERE TO ALLY WITH SOUTH AFRICA -- YOU CANNOT BE MORE PAPIST THAN THE POSE."

8. I SEE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH A ZAIRIAN AND PERHAPS A WIDER AFRICAN APPROACH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, NOR WITH A PUBLIC APPEAL BY ZAIRE AND PERHAPS OTHER AFRICAN STATES FOR U.S. AND WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER THE SOVIETS. BOTH OF THESE INITIATIVES COULD BE HELPFUL IN GATHERING SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. THE IDEA OF AN AFRICAN DELEGATION MADE UP OF, FOR EXAMPLE, ZAIRE, ZAMBIA, SENEGAL, IVORY COAST, CAR, GABON, UNITA AND FNLA LEADERS MAKING ITS OWN CASE IN THE U.S. ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE MERIT. THE BLACK/SOUTH AFRICAN "ALLIANCE" IS, HOWEVER SOMETHING THAT COULD CAUSE US CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS IN A NUMBER OF AREAS AND PLAY INTO THE SOVIET HAND IN AFRICA. I BELIEVE IT IS EVIDENT THAT I NEED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 KINSHA 00397 161621Z

GUIDANCE ON HOW TO ADDRESS ALL OF THESE ISSUES WHEN I SEE MOBUTU. END COMMENT.

CUTLER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, INTERVENTION, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, POLITICAL STABILITY, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, COMBAT OPERATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, C AT-C
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976KINSHA00397
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X2
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P840104-2135
From: KINSHASA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760150/aaaabsna.tel
Line Count: 157
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 76 KINSHASA 388
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 JUL 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <06 JUL 2004 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <18 OCT 2004 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ANGOLA: GOZ CONTEMPLATES UN ACTION
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, CG, AO, US, UR, CU, UN
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006